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It is encouraging to see very significant increases in interest in animal welfare in recent
years and decades, including the large growth of scientific publications on animal welfare
science (e.g., Walker et al., 2014). We should have had more compassion earlier and should
have done more for animal welfare. However, better late than never. With the current
increase in interest, if it is sustained, much more could be done. This paper attempts to
show how welfare biology (which I helped to develop two decades ago; see Ng, 1995) could
help. The hope is to make recommendations that will help resolve some difficult problems
surrounding animal welfare (Carpendale, 2013/2016). There are some simple,
commonsense methods that can help reduce animal suffering enormously at little cost — or
even a net gain — to humans. Finally, how animal welfare advocates could increase their
influence will be discussed.
Welfare Biology vs. the World Knot
Schopenhauer’s (1906/2014) “world knot” refers to the philosophical problem of
explaining consciousness: How could the material brain give rise to feeling? How could
matter give rise to mind? This world knot is so difficult to unravel that it has lately been
dubbed “the hard problem” (Chalmers, 1995). The philosopher Daniel Dennett’s (1991)
book is called Consciousness Explained, but having read the book from cover to cover and
understood virtually everything in it, I still have not seen consciousness explained by even
0.01%. In a very informative book (very highly recommended) reporting on many
important recent findings in the neurosciences, Ramachandran (2012, p. 247) states that
“Sometime in the twenty-first century, science will confront one of its last great mysteries:
the nature of the self.” I take this to mean the solution of the world knot. Ramachandran is
apparently encouraged by important new findings to which he personally also contributed.
Nevertheless, I do not believe the world knot will be unraveled even in the thirty-first
century.
The difficulty of solving the hard problem is related to the difficulty of whether
others, including animals, feel, that is, whether they are conscious (the “other-minds
problem”). It is this empirical difficulty — together with an excessive concern about being
accused of naïve anthropomorphism (especially by biologists), along with the century-long
domination of Watson-Skinnerian behaviorism in psychology (though it had been waning in
the last few decades) — that has made scientific research on the problem of animal welfare
(and even just the recognition of the problem) so late in coming. The Cambridge Declaration
on Animal Consciousness was adopted as late as July 7, 2012. As summarized in Wikipedia on
Animal Welfare Science, “Although animal welfare has been of great concern for many
thousands of years in religion and culture, the investigation of animal welfare using
rigorous scientific methods is a relatively recent development. The world's first Professor of
Animal Welfare Science, Donald Broom, was appointed by Cambridge University (UK) in
1986.” The increasing interest in the last decade or so is hence much to be welcomed.
Although it is difficult to establish with certainty that any individual animal or
species is capable of feeling and hence that their welfare is a matter of concern, this
difficulty must not be over-emphasized. Strictly, this lack of 100% certainty applies also to
members of our own species; the only exception is oneself, the subject of the only feelings
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anyone can ever feel: One may have 100% certainty that one feels what one feels while one
is feeling it. This we already know from the outcome of Descartes’s meditations on doubt
and certainty: the Cogito. But in this philosophical sense of 100% certainty, one is not even
sure of the existence of the subjective feelings of one’s spouse! Hence surely 99.99999999%
is close enough to be taken as if 100% at the practical level. None of us worries about the
0.00…1% possibility that our spouses or close friends do not really feel either. Practically
the same goes for the feelings, and hence the welfare needs, of all mammals, if not all
vertebrates, as established in the recent field of affective neuroscience (e.g., Mashour &
Alkire, 2013). If we go beyond virtual certainty (99.9% +) to the level of almost certainty
(95% +), the range of animal species capable of feeling must be greatly widened, as even
crayfish appear to be capable of anxiety (Fossat, 2014). (For informative and interesting
accounts of the many impressive capabilities for feelings, including even moral feelings, of
many animal species far beyond what we would have imagined, see e.g., Balcombe, 2010,
and Bekoff, 2013.)
Dawkins (2014, p. 2) argues that “a seeming paradox at the heart of a science of
animal welfare” is created by the world knot: “To be comprehensive enough to include what
most people mean by animal welfare, it must involve understanding what animals
consciously feel and experience. But to be a science, it has to embrace the one thing that
biology currently finds very difficult, if not impossible to study, namely, animal
consciousness.” Dawkins discusses four ways out of this paradox: (1) denying the paradox
by regarding animal consciousness as not a problem for scientific study; (2) doing the next
best thing, by studying behavioral and physiological correlates of consciousness instead of
studying consciousness directly; (3) believing that the paradox will disappear with more
research; (4) regarding the resolution of the paradox as not central to a scientific study of
animal welfare. As an eclectic, I believe that all four approaches contain some valid
elements, but they are not enough to resolve the paradox fully. Instead of discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of these four approaches in detail, I explain below how
welfare biology (Ng, 1995) may help to resolve the paradox, or at least reduce its impact,
and to provide useful guides on many issues of animal welfare.
In my welfare biology paper of 1995, I defined welfare biology as the study of living
things with respect to their welfare, defined as net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering)
and used evolutionary biology, population dynamics and economics to help answer three
basic questions in welfare biology: (1) The individual members of which species are capable
of suffering/enjoyment? (2) Are their welfare levels positive or negative? (3) How could
their welfare be increased? These three questions of which, whether, and how somewhat
parallel the three basic questions of economics: What, how, and for whom are the various
goods and services produced? My basic training as an economist no doubt influenced my
choice of the three basic welfare biological questions.
Owing to the difficulty of the world knot, the first question is very difficult to answer
directly. However, using compelling axioms based on the principles of evolutionary biology,
I show that a species must be flexible for its members to be capable of feeling. Roughly
speaking, brain mechanisms giving rise to feelings must consume energy. If these feelings
do not affect the flexible behavioral choices of the species, they do not contribute to their
survival and reproductive fitness, and hence they cannot survive evolutionary competition.
In evolutionary equilibrium, traits that are not adaptive are not retained. Thus, the
behaviors of feeling species must be flexible, that is, not completely hard-wired genetically.
3
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This constraint transforms the first question about consciousness (which is very difficult to
answer) into one about flexible behavior (still difficult but less so). If we can establish that
the behavior of a species is completely inflexible, its members are unlikely capable of feeling.
In contrast, species capable of flexible choices are likely to be capable of
suffering/enjoyment.
This result obviously has important implications for the study of animal welfare.
However, it has not been widely noticed during two decades since its publication. As I am
not a biologist by training, I could develop the result only in its general terms. Further
specific developments and applications call for more specific knowledge beyond my
expertise. I hope that some biologists and those interested in animal welfare will be able to
build further progress on my contributions.
Apart from the result about behavioral flexibility and feeling, my 1995 paper has
several other implications that may be relevant for animal welfare. Generalizing the LotkaVolterra model of population dynamics, I showed that welfare can be increased without
reducing the number of individual animals. This result was applied by Clarke and Ng (2006).
Simple and Low-Cost Ways to Reduce Animal Suffering
There are simple ways to reduce animal suffering substantially at a very low or zero cost —
or even a net gain — to humans. The following examples are just illustrative.
First, some simple regulations on the farming of animals can drastically reduce
animal suffering. For example, in the factory farming of chickens, simple regulations on the
minimum cage size can significantly improve chicken welfare. The inadequacy of current
regulations and the inaction toward improving them are largely due to mistaken ideas. Most
producers believe that stricter regulations will increase their costs and reduce their profits.
However, since industries like factory chicken farming are highly competitive, they cannot
generate long-run supernormal profits; they can only earn average rates of return. Thus,
after a temporary period of adjustment, stricter regulations will only increase the prices of
the final products without affecting the profitability of the producers. True, consumers will
then have to pay higher prices. However, despite temporary setbacks due to the recent
financial crisis, the longer-term trend is for more and more consumers to be willing to pay
higher prices for products that involve less cruelty to animals (e.g., Grimsrud et al., 2013;
Lagerkvist & Hess, 2011; Miranda-de la Lama et al., 2013; Napolitano, 2010).
Moreover, at least for the developed economies, meat consumption is unhealthily
excessive. Thus, the higher prices for meat, by inducing consumers to buy less meat,
actually make them better off. The costs for humans of improving animal welfare may well
be negative! This is not just wishful thinking, but it is supported by research. As shown by
Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), taxes on cigarettes that increase their prices actually
make smokers healthier and happier. An important role for animal welfare advocates would
hence be to educate the public about this, showing how it would be to society’s advantage to
adopt stricter regulations on reducing animal suffering.
Second, the prohibition of cruelty to animals that serves no purpose at all should be
extended. Just two examples are given here. First, as reported by Bekoff (2013, pp. 230-231)
on the study of David Evans and Paul McGreevy (2011), “whipping horses [in horse racing]
is pointless and does not make a difference in the outcome of the race … increased whip use
was not associated with significant variation in velocity.” I would go further. Even if
4
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whipping were effective in increasing the speed, it should still be completely banned.
Suppose whipping increased speed by x%. After banning, the speed of all horses would
decrease by about x%. Since this applies to all horses in the race, it would not affect the
competitive outcome. Problems such as unfairness would arise only if some horses were
allowed to be whipped and some not. As banning should apply to all, no real problems are
created, but we save much suffering for the horses.
As another example, fish mongers in the wet markets in Hong Kong (probably in
other places as well) use the practice of cutting eels into two halves alive, leaving them
wriggling in pain to attract customers and to show that their fish are very fresh. I have
argued with them more than once that this would inflict pain. No one challenged me on this.
However, one replied to me, “If I cannot sell the fish, I will also suffer pain!” Even assuming
that the fish mongers are right in thinking that the practice helps them sell fish, it should
still be banned. The pain of being cut into half and writhing in pain until death is too terrible
to be tolerated. Moreover, forbidding a fish monger to do this only hurts him if others are
allowed to continue to do it. If all fish mongers are prevented by law and enforcement from
engaging in this cruel practice, they can still sell fish at the same rates.
As in the horse whipping example above, this is just another case of relative
competition between individual producers or consumers that leads to inefficient social
outcomes and a lot of needless suffering. Society needs to adopt legislative and lawenforcement measures to ban such inefficient competition that really serves no good
purpose and causes so much gratuitous suffering. This should be distinguished from
competition between producers in reducing costs or increasing the quality of products in a
way that does increase efficiency. This efficient competition (that does not involve cruelty
and other external costs like pollution) should be allowed if not encouraged. The problem is
not competition as such but external costs to other sentients.
Third, we should put less emphasis on GDP (gross domestic product) and its growth
and more on the environment and true welfare for both humans and other animals.
Research in recent decades has shown that, above a relatively low threshold level, further
increases in an individual’s consumption do not really increase happiness significantly (as
surveyed in Diener et al., 2010; Ng, 2015). This is even truer at the social level. Each
individual may still find higher income and consumption important because of relative
comparisons. However, at the social level, an increase in the relative standing of one implies
decreases for others. On average, the relative income of the whole society cannot change. In
addition, the production and consumption of most goods and services involve significant
environmental disruption. Thus, even just from the human welfare point of view, we have
excessive production and consumption. Income and consumption taxes, instead of being
distortive (by distorting choices and hence imposing burdens on producers and consumers
by an amount larger than the taxes collected) as most economists believe, are actually
corrective (Ng, 2003). Moreover, economic growth may be (human) welfare-decreasing,
even while ignoring the big destruction of the habitats of nonhuman animals. If we take
account of animal welfare, even just weighting their relative importance at only 1%, the
desirability of environmentally unfriendly growth becomes very doubtful. When I proposed
the environmentally responsible happy nation index (Ng, 2008) to supplement if not
replace GDP, I took mainly human welfare into consideration. The additional consideration
of animal welfare further strengthens the case for greater conservation and against
environmental disruption.
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Environmental and animal welfare protection may be costly in reducing GDP
produced. However, at least for most advanced economies, as higher consumption no
longer increases happiness, the costs may only be large in monetary terms but trivial or
even negative in true welfare terms. Money does not buy happiness, but since happiness
also includes ultimate values, it may be that environmental and animal welfare protection is
not really costly at all!
Increasing the Influence of Animal Welfare Advocates
This final section discusses some considerations that could be relevant to increasing the
influence of animal welfare advocates.
First, we should be cautious not to exaggerate our claims in the hope of making them
more convincing. For example, I find Bekoff’s (2013) book very readable and informative,
but I also find some of his conclusions somewhat hyperbolic. For example, the piece on “The
Birds and the Bees and Their Brains: Size Doesn’t Matter” presents evidence “that we need
to be very careful making claims that invertebrates do not have emotional lives or feelings”
(p. 153) because even small insect with tiny brains may be capable of much more feelings
than we expect. So far this is fine. However, the conclusion that the size (of brains) doesn’t
matter is unwarranted. The evidence presented does not show that size does not matter,
only that it is not the only thing that matters and that small size does not entail absence of
feeling. The piece refers to Jerison’s (1973) encephalization quotient: the positive
proportionate excess of brain weight over 2/3 of the body weight. The parameter of 2/3 of
the body weight is used because body surface area increases quadratically with
proportionate increase in width, height, and length, whereas body weight increases
cubically. The two-third increase in brain size is thus required simply to coordinate body
senses and movement.
Jerison’s data show clearly that this encephalization quotient shows a very clear
positive correlation with intelligence. It cannot be concluded that size does not matter. It is
true that intelligence is not feelings and that one does not have to be very intelligent to have
strong feelings. It is also true that the matter of moral concern “is not a capacity to think, but
a capacity to feel” (Balcombe, 2010, p. 44). However, the two are related (e.g., Keltner &
Horberg, 2015) and there is some correlation between a brain’s size and complexity and its
capability for both intelligence and feelings. The relevant brain structures and functions
would seem to be the nociceptive ones, not just brute size, although brain size clearly
matters as well. A brain of only a few neurons seems unlikely to be capable of either high
intelligence or strong feelings.
Another example (quite common among biologists) of excessive claims is “All life has
value and should be respected” (Bekoff, 2013, p. 309). In my view, it is not life as such that
has value, but feeling (i.e., pleasures and pains in a wide sense, including spiritual and
sensuous) that are of value (to the feeler). Values are felt values. If plants have no feelings,
then, as non-feelers, they have no felt values of their own — though their lives may have
high instrumental values for sustaining the lives of feeling animals.
Second, there are strategies that animal welfare advocates can use to increase their
influence on behalf of feeling organisms without having to resort to hyperbole. One way is
to focus efforts initially on measures that can increase animal welfare or reduce animal
6
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suffering enormously at small or even negative costs to humans, as discussed in the
previous section, rather than on measures that are much more costly and likely to engender
much more resistance. That way, acceptance and progress can be achieved more effectively.
Third, and related to the previous point, one consideration is the distinction between
wild animals and farmed animals. Being much more numerous, wild animals are much more
important in general and in the long term. However, as a near-term strategy, I suggest that,
without ignoring wild animals altogether, our initial emphasis should be more on farmed
animals, for a number of reasons. We are in more direct contact and directly responsible for
their suffering. Hence, we are likely to gain converts more easily on this front. Also, for wild
animals, we have less knowledge of them and have less influence over them (except for our
encroachment on their traditional living habitats). Hence, our attempts to help them today
may be less effective and less certain. Also, changes in the situation in the wild may have
more long-term ecological repercussions. Hence, it may be wise to leave most measures on
their behalf to the to the future, when we know more, after much more scientific progress,
and after much greater concern for farmed animals has become the norm, legally and
culturally.
Fourth, and related to the previous two points, we must recognize that we will be
able to help animals more if and when our levels of scientific knowledge and technological
and economic capabilities are much higher. Thus, while we should definitely do everything
possible to reduce animal suffering where it is clearly unnecessary for either human or
animal welfare, we should be careful in pressing for the curtailment of animal research that
can increase our scientific knowledge in the interests of human or animal welfare. Impeding
scientific advances could prove harmful not only to ourselves, but also to animals in the
long run.
I view scientists using animals in their research as our potential collaborators rather
than our enemies. We should of course persuade them to use the least painful means of
experimentation possible. We should discourage and work to ban painful or stressful
animal experimentation that serves no important purpose (e.g., to improve cosmetics, used
for competition in attractiveness between individuals, which is mutually canceling at the
social level, as discussed above). While we still desperately need advances in bioscience,
human and veterinary medicine and technology, it makes far more sense for the initial focus
of animal welfare advocates to be on reducing the enormous gratuitous suffering in factory
farming. Even on this more limited scope of reducing suffering for farmed animals, we have
so many things to work hard on.
In closing, my view on making an initial distinction between wild and farmed animal
welfare, and on giving initial priority to reducing harm to animals when it is virtually
costless and does not impede scientific advances, is just a starting position. Palpable
progress with these relatively easier welfare problems will then serve as a foundation for
extending our future efforts in eliminating all needless non-human and human animal
suffering on the planet.
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The Israel Journal of Ecology and Evolution is seeking manuscript submissions for a special edition on
Compassionate Conservation. Guest editors are Drs. Dror Ben-Ami and Daniel Ramp. They are inviting
original research that is exemplary of Compassionate Conservation values. Compassionate Conservation
builds the welfare of individual wildlife into conservation practice to improve outcomes for individuals,
species and ecosystems. It has four guiding principles: a commitment to doing no harm as a starting point
for intervention, individuals matter, all wildlife are worthy of conservation, and peaceful coexistence should
be the ultimate aim for conservation practice. Practical examples include non-lethal management of wildlife
populations, including animal welfare in conservation solutions, non-invasive monitoring techniques for
studying wildlife, and engagement of human communities to minimise human-wildlife conflict.

For more information please contact Daniel Ramp at Daniel.Ramp@uts.edu.au
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